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‘Revealed theology’ claims that religious belief derives from divine revelation and can only 
be justified in the light of such revelation. This entails a retreat into an intellectual ghetto: 
Only believers can participate in this kind of theology because only believers have access to 
divine revelation. The usual alternative to revealed theology is ‘natural theology’, which tries 
to prove the truth of (Christian) faith in the light of the universally accessible criteria of reason 
and experience. It is argued that natural theology fails to provide such proof and therefore 
cannot liberate theology from the intellectual ghetto of revealed theology. This paper argues 
for a ‘philosophical theology’ which analyses the meaning of (Christian) doctrine rather than 
proving its truth. Since the methods and criteria of this analysis are universally acceptable and 
not reserved for believers, this form of theology liberates believers from the intellectual ghetto 
of revealed theology. 
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Theology in the ghetto
Like me, Etienne de Villiers studied theology at Stellenbosch. I did so in the 1950s and he in the 
1960s. Both of us combined the course in theology with a master’s degree in philosophy. At that 
time, this combination was not without its difficulties. Some of our teachers in theology were rather 
suspicious of students in theology who also were trained in philosophy. Such students tended 
to ask difficult questions and seemed to demand a philosophical justification of the theological 
views put forward by their teachers. According to these teachers, our theological views could only 
be justified with an appeal to the Bible, and more specifically to the Bible as interpreted within 
the Reformed tradition. The Bible contains divine revelation, and our theological views should 
be based on such revelation and not on philosophy. Let us call this view on the justification of 
religious beliefs ‘revealed theology’. 
The trouble with revealed theology is that it seems to entail a form of fideism in which Christian 
theology is withdrawn into an intellectual ghetto. On this view, theologians and believers base 
their religious truth claims on grounds not accessible to everybody but only to believers who 
have privileged access to divine revelation. Outsiders who reject the authority of the Bible have 
no access to such revelation and are therefore unable to determine the truth of religious belief. 
Sometimes this is extended to include not only the truth but also the meaning of religious claims. 
Thus for example, Austin (1967) argues that: 
the affirmation-negation paradox is of fundamental importance in theology, giving expression to the 
principle that the religious ultimate is beyond all human concepts, so that what is affirmed of it must also be 
denied. (p. 49)
Since God in this way transcends our human concepts, religious beliefs also transcend the rules 
of general logic and have a special paradoxical logic of their own which only believers are able to 
apply. Believers alone can determine what religious claims mean and what they entail (on the 
difficulties with this view on religious language, see chapter 2 in Jeffner 1986 and chapter 2 in 
Brümmer 1992). Believers then not only have privileged access to the truth but also to the meaning 
of religious claims. By making the criteria for truth and meaning purely internal to faith, this view 
seems to immunise theology and religious belief from all external criticism. This protection is 
obtained at a price, however, since it entails that all alternative religious views can claim the same 
protection. None of them can be criticised from the outside, nor can they criticise each other. The 
result is an extreme form of religious relativism that I do not suppose the defenders of revealed 
theology set out to achieve in the first place! 
It seems therefore that, in order to avoid these fideistic implications, theologians will have to appeal 
to common standards of meaning and rationality as these have been developed in philosophy in 
order to justify the claims they defend. In justifying their beliefs, they must appeal to some basic 
intellectual meeting-point common to everybody, both believers and non-believers. How are we 
to set about finding this common intellectual meeting point in terms of which the truth claims of 
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Christianity are to be justified? One of the most significant 
attempts by philosophers at finding such a common ground 
for religious belief is that proposed by the traditional rival of 
revealed theology, namely ‘natural theology’. 
Whilst revealed theology tries to derive the truth claims of 
religion from a revelation only accessible to believers, natural 
theology tries to justify religious truth claims by deriving 
them from universal grounds of reason and experience 
that are in principle accessible to everybody. In this way, 
natural theology tries to prove the truth claims of religion 
by basing them on grounds which are acceptable to both 
believers and non-believers. As we shall argue in this article, 
this project of natural theology also faces grave difficulties. 
On the one hand, it tends to reduce Christian doctrine to the 
lowest common denominator shared by all forms of theism 
whilst, on the other hand, it necessarily fails in the end to 
provide the required universally acceptable grounds to 
justify believing even this reduced form of theism. In the final 
analysis, the reasons believers have for accepting Christian 
doctrine must in some way involve an appeal to revelation. 
That being the case, how can theology avoid being relegated 
to an intellectual ghetto? Is it possible to develop a form of 
theology which avoids retreating into an intellectual ghetto 
and can nevertheless account for the fact that Christian faith 
(and mutatis mutandis all other faiths) is in some way or other 
derived from revelation? 
Philosophical theology 
A possible candidate that might be considered here is the 
kind of ‘philosophical theology’ defended by Kretzmann. 
Kretzmann (1989) defines philosophical theology by 
distinguishing it from natural theology: 
I’m using the term ’philosophical theology‘ in a sense that seems 
at least on its way to becoming standard, a sense in which it 
is to be distinguished from natural theology, the other sort of 
theology that has been practised by philosophers. Natural 
theology may be broad or strict in its criteria for admissible 
premises, but its specific characteristic is its refusal to admit as 
premises any doctrinal propositions that are not also accessible 
to observation and reason. Supporters of natural theology would 
explain that it imposes those strictures in order to be able to 
claim that it can offer proof. Philosophical theology shares the 
methods of natural theology broadly conceived – i.e. analysis and 
argumentation of all the sorts acceptable in philosophy and the 
sciences – but it lifts natural theology’s restriction on premises. In 
particular, philosophical theology accepts as premises doctrinal 
propositions that are not also initially accessible to observation 
and reason. From a philosophical point of view, it takes up 
such premises as assumptions. Argumentation based on such 
premises may be (and historically have been) as rigorous as any, 
but the status of its premises of course precludes its satisfying 
the peculiarly stringent criteria of Aristotelian demonstration. 
A philosophical theologian engaged in such reasoning tests the 
coherence of doctrinal propositions, develops their implications, 
attempts explanations of them, discovers their connections 
with other doctrinal propositions, and so on, with no pretence 
at offering proofs of the sort putatively available in natural 
theology. (pp. 15–16)
According to Kretzmann’s definition above, natural theology 
is an enterprise claiming to achieve knowledge of God that can 
be justified on generally accessible grounds, that is ‘premises 
accessible to observation and reason’. As I suggested above, 
there are two serious objections to this enterprise. First of 
all, knowledge claims about God are impossible without an 
appeal to revelation, and since revelation is only accessible 
to those who experience it with the ‘eyes of faith’, it cannot 
provide any universally acceptable proof. We will return to 
this point in more detail under the heading ‘Philosophical 
theology and fideism’. Secondly, in its search for universally 
acceptable knowledge of God, natural theology tries to 
defend knowledge claims that are not distinctive for any 
specific religion but are accessible to all who are endowed 
with ‘observation and reason’ (Kretzmann 1989:15). But then, 
as Kretzmann point out, all central doctrines of any specific 
religion are beyond the reach of natural theology. Kretzmann 
(1989) thus claims that:
[a]ll the distinctively Christian doctrines are … initially 
inaccessible to observation and reason. And so, because the 
strictures of natural theology preclude it’s considering the 
doctrines which are the very differentiae of Christianity, 
the philosophy that is natural theology is at best adjacent to 
Christianity, not in it. (p. 16)
In appealing exclusively to universally acceptable grounds, 
natural theology fails to achieve the knowledge of God as 
distinctive for the Christian tradition. In this way, natural 
theology falls outside the bounds of classical Christian 
theology.
In this regard, Schwöbel (1994) has shown persuasively that 
the kind of natural theology referred to here arose in the 
17th and 18th centuries in response to the religious wars 
and to the renewal of an atheistic critique of Christian faith 
after the Reformation. Faced with the socially disastrous 
effects of warring confessional factions in European society, 
this response tried to produce a common rational theistic 
concept of God transcending the confessional pluralism of 
the Christian tradition. This common concept of God could 
then serve as the basis for unity in European society. The 
result was: 
a de-contextualization of the Christian concept of God which is 
abstracted from its conceptual setting in the doctrinal scheme 
of Christian theology and from its context in the practice of 
Christian faith. (Schwöbel 1994:179)
In this respect, Kretzmann’s (1989) philosophical theology is 
different:
Philosophical theology, the ongoing project of supporting, 
elucidating, extending, and connecting propositions of Christian 
doctrine by the standard philosophical means of analysis and 
argument, is now and always has been the active philosophy 
in Christianity … During the Middle Ages, the golden age 
of philosophical theology, the vast majority of Christian 
philosophers contributed to this enterprise. (p. 16)
Contrary to natural theology, therefore, philosophical 
theology does indeed deal with the central doctrines of the 
Christian tradition. However, philosophical theology treats 
these doctrinal propositions as ‘assumptions’ of which it tries 
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to analyse the meaning and not to prove the truth. Unlike 
natural theology, it seeks not proof but understanding as in 
the classical theological enterprise of fides quaerens intellectum 
[faith seeking understanding]. Its primary aim is not to prove 
the truth of Christian doctrine but rather to illuminate its 
meaning by analysing its implications and presuppositions 
and to propose coherent ways in which it could be 
conceptualised: ‘Supporting, elucidating, extending, and 
connecting propositions of Christian doctrine’ (Kretzmann 
1989:16). 
Whether or not the individual philosophical theologian 
accepts these assumptions as his or her own is in the end 
a personal matter. In order to accept the truth of these 
assumptions with integrity, believers have to recognise this 
truth through ‘experiences of disclosure or discovery which 
are not the result of human epistemic activity’ (Schwöbel 
1994:184). At this level, all faith is truly personal. In the words 
of Smith: ‘My faith is an act that I make, myself, naked before 
God’ (Smith 1978:191). Of course, this does not exclude the 
possibility that others might share my personal faith by 
recognising it as similar to their own. In fact, all believers have 
the desire that their own personal faith might correspond to 
that of others in the community of believers, for only then 
will they be able to identify with the community without 
sacrificing their own personal integrity in order to do so. 
Nevertheless, whether somebody can subscribe to the truth 
of doctrinal assumptions will finally depend on whether he 
or she can personally accept these with integrity. We should 
note, however, that this kind of ‘person-relativity’ (chapter 2 
in Mavrodes 1970) does not only apply to religious beliefs. In a 
way, it is a general feature of all the beliefs which people hold 
to be true. In this regard, Augustine was right in pointing out 
that, however much a pupil can learn from his teacher, there is 
one thing he must always discover for himself, that is whether 
what his teacher tells him is true because no one can discern 
this truth for him in his stead: 
If my hearer sees these things himself with his inward eye, he 
comes to know what I say, not as a result of my words but as a 
result of his own contemplation. Even when I speak what is true, 
it is not I who teach him. He is taught not by my words but by the 
things themselves which inwardly God has made manifest to him. 
(Augustine 1953:12.40)
The closing words in this quotation suggest that it is here that 
the concept of revelation comes in. Although all truth claims 
eventually depend on the personal recognition of those who 
accept them, religious believers tend, in the light of their faith, 
to ascribe this recognition to illumination by the Spirit of God. 
In the words of Calvin, the Spirit ‘with a wondrous and special 
energy, forms the ear to hear and the mind to understand’ 
(Calvin 1953:2.2.20). In this sense, Christian theology in essence 
rests on faith in the revelation of God.
Recognising the truth of doctrinal assumptions therefore 
involves an appeal to revelation. However, analysing their 
meaning does not. Whether or not philosophical theologians 
recognise the truth of the doctrinal assumptions that they 
analyse does not directly affect the kind of conceptual 
questions about presuppositions and implications they 
address, nor does it affect the kind of philosophical analyses 
they employ to deal with them. Of course, the personal faith of 
philosophical theologians could motivate them to ask certain 
specific questions rather than others and also to analyse 
the Christian doctrine rather than the doctrines of some 
other religion or view of life. However, such commitments 
do not affect the methods or the criteria with which these 
conceptual issues about the meaning of the Christian doctrine 
is addressed. The basic intellectual meeting point common 
to believers and non-believers cannot therefore consist in a 
common rational basis for recognising the truth of Christian 
doctrines as is assumed in natural theology. It can however 
be found in the methods and criteria by which philosophical 
theologians analyse the meaning of these doctrines. 
Meaning and truth
Unlike natural theology, philosophical theology thus seeks 
to analyse the meaning of (Christian) doctrine rather than 
to prove its truth. Nevertheless philosophical theologians 
are deeply interested in the question of truth because there 
is a close connection between meaning and truth. If the 
meaning of a doctrinal proposition is its use, then it is part 
of the meaning of the proposition to either express or entail 
truth claims. Analysing the meaning of a religious doctrine 
therefore includes analysing and evaluating the truth claims 
expressed or entailed by it.
At this point, it is important to note the contextual nature 
of meaning (see Brümmer 1993; Brümmer 1999). If the 
meaning of an utterance is given in its use, this is always its 
use within a specific context of human life and thought. Thus 
the meaning of a religious doctrine or proposition cannot be 
abstracted from the religious language game which is the 
context of its employment within human life and thought. 
Such abstraction leads to the ‘decontextualisation’ against 
which we have heard Schwöbel (1994) warn us above. This 
also applies to the truth claims expressed or entailed by such 
religious doctrines within this context. Thus the justification 
of religious beliefs is primarily an attempt to demonstrate 
their legitimacy within the context of the language game of 
religion. But then our understanding of this language game 
will determine the nature of the justification we seek to 
provide.
Since the Enlightenment, Western culture has intuitively 
tended to reduce all thinking to its epistemic dimensions 
(see chapter 18 in Brümmer 2006). This tendency has 
been markedly strengthened by the successes of scientific 
enquiry. ‘How do you know?’ has become the basic question 
dominating all our thinking. Accordingly, the role of religious 
belief in human life and thought is often thought of in purely 
epistemic terms. Like science, religion has what Adriaanse 
calls an ‘informative result-orientation’ (Adriaanse 1995:175) 
since it is aimed at providing us with knowledge about the 
world, human existence and God. Religious beliefs about 
these matters are taken to be factual hypotheses of a sort 
that theology is required to test in order to demonstrate 
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their theoretical legitimacy. The key issue to be resolved is 
whether these hypotheses have to be tested in the light of 
‘revelation’ (as is held in revealed theology) or in the light of 
observation and reason (as is held in natural theology). This 
view seriously reduces the role of religious belief in human 
life and thought. I agree with Stenmark’s (1998) comment 
that:
since the relevant aim of religion is then taken to be merely 
epistemic, the ‘theist’ whose beliefs are examined, in fact turns 
out to be a purely epistemic being (a being whose sole concern 
is believing as many truths and as few falsehoods as possible). 
But the problem is that actual religious believers - whether 
Christian or not – are not purely epistemic beings, and it would 
be irrational for them to be so! … Actual religious believers are 
the kind of creatures who live in a world that has dangerous 
surprises from which their well-being must be secured … The 
job religion does is (among other things) to help them find a way 
of getting through the barriers of suffering and death, guilt and 
meaninglessness. (p. 278)
Actual religious believers are people who try to make 
sense of their lives and of their experience of the world 
by interpreting these in terms of the faith which has been 
handed down to them in the religious tradition with which 
they can identify with integrity. Thus Christians understand 
their lives as meaningful because these are lived in fellowship 
with God. We are significant beings because God loves us. 
Our experience of the world is also meaningful because of 
the many ways in which God is involved in the things we 
experience. Thus many events are experienced as acts in 
which God realises his purposes and for which he is to be 
thanked; other events are experienced as contrary to God’s 
will and therefore to be opposed. Thus life and the world 
are meaningful because of the way these are related to God. 
Believers understand this complex relationship between 
God, themselves and the world in terms of the heritage of 
conceptual models, metaphors and narratives which has been 
handed down to them in their own religious tradition. In this 
way, religious belief is hermeneutical rather than epistemic 
(see chapter 9 in Brümmer 2008). It is not primarily a way 
of knowing but a way of understanding that determines 
the meaning and significance of life and the world. This 
understanding is existential in the sense that it determines 
which actions and attitudes are appropriate in relationship to 
God, the world and other people. Faith is therefore not only 
a way of understanding but also a way of life in accordance 
with this understanding. In this way, faith also determines 
the moral life of believers (chapter 7 in Brümmer 2008; De 
Villiers 1978).
The claim that religious belief is primarily hermeneutical 
rather than epistemic does not entail a non-cognitive view 
of religious belief. Religious belief is primarily a way of 
understanding, but this way of understanding entails a 
variety of truth claims about the world, human existence and 
God. It is important to distinguish here between three kinds 
of truth claims involved in such religious understanding: 
empirical claims, claims regarding religious experience and 
metaphysical claims concerning the existence and attributes 
of God. 
Empirical truth claims are claims which in principle can 
be (or could have been) verified empirically by anyone. 
Although empirical claims are not strictly speaking religious 
claims, religious beliefs often entail such empirical claims. 
Understanding events in our own lives and experience 
or in history in terms of our faith presupposes that these 
events really occurred. Thus Archbishop Usher’s religious 
claim that God created the universe 6000 years ago entails 
the empirical claim that the universe is 6000 years old. 
The religious claim that God led the people of Israel out of 
Egyptian bondage to a Promised Land entails the empirical 
claim that the Israelites migrated from Egypt to Palestine. 
The religious claim that Jesus triumphed over death by 
rising from the grave entails the empirical claim that a dead 
person was in some way resuscitated. The acceptability of 
such empirical claims does not depend on religious faith 
but on empirical tests. If any of these should prove to be 
mistaken, believers will have to reinterpret their religious 
beliefs in such a way that they no longer entail such mistaken 
empirical claims. If such reinterpretation should prove to be 
impossible, the religious claims in question will lose their 
credibility. Thus Usher’s claim about the age of the universe 
has been effectively falsified by the findings of astronomy, 
geology and palaeontology, and most believers today have 
come to interpret their belief in divine creation in ways 
that are consistent with scientific findings about the age of 
the universe. Because of the empirical unlikelihood of the 
resuscitation of a dead person, many believers tend to also 
reinterpret the meaning of the resurrection of Jesus in ways 
that are empirically more plausible. Since the biblical record 
of the resurrection is by no means clear regarding the precise 
factual details of the resurrection event (the resurrected 
Jesus was in many ways a very different kind of being from 
the Jesus who was crucified), such a reinterpretation is not 
without some plausibility. However, a resurrection in some 
form or other, although unlikely, is not logically impossible. 
Thus Smart (1964) suggests that we: 
[i]magine Hume being present at someone’s rising from the 
dead. What does he say to himself? ‘Impossible, gentlemen, 
impossible. This is contrary to all my previous experience of 
mortality, and to the testimony of countless human beings. It 
would be a lesser miracle that my eyes deceive me than that 
this resurrection should have occurred.’ Well, perhaps of course 
his eyes do deceive him. Let him test them. Let him investigate 
minutely the resurrected body. Can he still doubt? (p. 34)
If a sceptic like Hume is confronted with a situation like 
this, he might be moved to accept the empirical claim about 
the resurrection. However, this does not mean that he also 
has to accept the religious claim about a miraculous divine 
action. He could also look on the event as an extraordinary 
and inexplicable anomaly and leave it at that. As the South 
African theologian Andrew Murray pointed out (Murray 
1942:126, 128), it is only with the ‘eyes of faith’ that believers 
can recognise an (extraordinary or inexplicable) event as an 
act of God. Without faith such events are mere anomalies 
without any religious significance. Here too empirical 
claims regarding such events neither presuppose nor entail 
any religious belief. It follows that religious truth claims 
cannot simply be derived from empirical experience as 
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natural theology supposes. This will only be possible if such 
empirical experience has first been understood in terms of 
faith. Here too religious experience is hermeneutical rather 
than epistemic. But then the ‘proofs’ provided by natural 
theology are circular since the experience on which they are 
based presuppose the faith which it tries to prove.
Unlike empirical claims, claims about religious experience do 
presuppose religious belief. Religious believers understand 
their lives and their experience of the world in terms of the 
conceptual models and metaphors derived from the religious 
tradition in which they stand (on the role of religious models 
and metaphors, see chapter 13 in Brümmer 2006). As we 
pointed out above, believers experience their own lives as 
meaningful because, in many ways, these are for them lived 
in fellowship with God, and the world is meaningful because 
of the many ways in which they believe God to be involved 
in what happens in the world. Some events are experienced 
as gracious acts of God whereas others are contrary to God’s 
will and to be opposed by us. It is clear that believers can only 
thus experience the world in terms of the providential agency 
of God in the light of their own anterior beliefs about the will 
of God. In fact, it is only with the ‘eyes of faith’ that they 
can experience events as expressions of divine grace in their 
lives and in the world rather than as mere inexplicable but 
fortunate anomalies or coincidences. Religious experience is 
therefore religiously interpreted experience, and as such, it is 
not open to empirical verification. For this reason, religious 
experience cannot provide the universally shared grounds 
which natural theology requires for its attempt to prove the 
truth of religious beliefs. As we have argued above, such 
‘proofs’ will always be circular (see chapter 8 in Brümmer 
2006). This does not mean that such religious interpretations 
are immune to criticism. Such criticism is, however, internal 
to the religious beliefs in terms of which the interpretation 
takes place. Within the religious tradition, it remains a point 
of discussion whether the interpretation is valid or not. Thus 
for example, it always remains an open question whether it 
is consistent with the faith to understand an event as one in 
which God realises his purposes. 
 
Metaphysical claims about the existence and nature of God 
are obviously not open to empirical verification since God 
is not an empirically observable object. Since God lives in an 
‘unapproachable light’, no one has ever seen or can ever see 
him (1 Tm 6:16, Jn 1:18). Neither can such claims be derived 
from empirical experience as natural theology supposes. For 
the same reason, such claims about God are also not claims 
about religious experience in the above sense. In the light 
of faith, we could experience the world as an expression 
of the grace of God or as the context within which we are 
called to do God’s will but not as an experience of God as 
such. In this respect too, he ‘lives in an unapproachable 
light’. Nevertheless such claims about God can be derived 
from religious experience in our lives and the world, in 
the sense that they are the constitutive presuppositions 
of such experience and of the way of life entailed by it (on 
‘constitutive presuppositions’ see chapter 10 in Brümmer 
2008). I logically cannot claim to live my life in fellowship 
with God without presupposing that God really exists and 
is the kind of being with whom such fellowship is possible. 
Also I logically cannot experience the world as an expression 
of God’s grace and as the context in which I am called to 
do God’s will without presupposing that God exists (on 
the concept of ‘existence’ applied to God, see chapter 17 in 
Brümmer 2006) and is in some way active as an agent in 
the world (on the concept of divine agency, see chapters 8 
and 26 in Brümmer 2006). Although such claims about the 
existence and agency of God are not empirical claims open 
to empirical verification or falsification, this does not mean 
that they are immune to criticism. Such criticism is, however, 
internal to the religious understanding and way of life which 
is constituted by these claims. Within a religious tradition, 
it always remains a point of discussion whether our beliefs 
about God are indeed such as are constitutive for the way of 
life and understanding which is given in the faith. 
Distinguishing and critically evaluating these various kinds 
of truth claims within a religious tradition is clearly part of the 
philosophical theologian’s ‘ongoing project of supporting, 
elucidating, extending and connecting propositions of 
Christian doctrine by the standard philosophical means of 
analysis and argument’ (Kretzmann 1989:16). However, such 
critical evaluation and rational justification always takes place 
within the context of the tradition of faith in terms of which 
believers make sense of their lives and experience. The critical 
question is always whether this religious understanding of 
experience or that metaphysical claim about the existence 
and nature of God is coherent with the tradition of faith. 
These truth claims cannot be decontextualised and evaluated 
as though they were simple empirical claims.
At this point, we might have the uncomfortable feeling that, 
in the end, this kind of philosophical theology fails to avoid 
the fideistic implications of revealed theology. After all, if the 
truth claims of religion can only be evaluated and justified 
critically within the context of a tradition of faith, does this 
not withdraw theology into the intellectual ghetto of revealed 
theology? Can this suspicion of fideism be removed?
Philosophical theology and fideism
Although the truth claims of religion can only be justified 
within the context of a tradition of faith, this would only 
entail a form of fideism if the tradition of faith as such 
were somehow immunised from criticism, doubt and 
rejection. That would only be the case if a tradition of faith 
were an immutable and indubitable system of ideas, and 
if furthermore it were somehow isolated from and thus 
unaffected by all other aspects of human life and thought 
in a way that would immunise it from outside influences. 
This would, however, be a serious misunderstanding of the 
nature of religious traditions.
All language games, including the language game of religion, 
are subject to historical and cultural change. Changes in the 
factual circumstances of our lives and in the problems and 
demands with which life confronts us give rise to changes in 
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our culture and thus also in the forms of thought which we 
find adequate, the language games in which these forms of 
thought find expression and in the concomitant beliefs which 
we hold to be true. The more we become aware of the cultural 
differences between different times and places, the more 
we realise the untenability of the platonic view that human 
thought is essentially timeless and immutable. Because of 
changes in the demands of life, our forms of thought can never 
remain adequate for all time. In this sense, we can understand 
Wittgenstein’s claim that the multiplicity of language games 
‘is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types 
of language, new language games, as we may say, come 
into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953:I.23). Elsewhere Wittgenstein (1980) 
illustrates this point as follows: 
Earlier physicists are said to have found suddenly that they had 
too little mathematical understanding to cope with physics; and 
in almost the same way young people today can be said to be in 
a situation where ordinary common sense no longer suffices to 
meet the strange demands life makes. Everything has become so 
intricate that mastering it would require an exceptional intellect. 
Because skill at playing the game is no longer enough; the 
question that keeps coming up is: can this game be played at all 
now and what would be the right game to play? (p. 27)
In this sense, Wittgenstein clearly admits that language 
games and the forms of life in which they are embedded are 
not immutable nor are they isolated from other aspects of 
our life and thought. For this reason, language games are not 
immune from criticism. They can be contested in the light of 
the changing demands of life.
Clearly this also applies to the language game of religion 
which is always embedded in an ongoing religious tradition. 
Such a tradition is not an immutable and isolated system of 
religious ideas. It is rather an historical process of transmission 
with a Wirkungsgeschichte and as such characterised by 
pluralism and change. Smith (chapter 6 in Smith 1978) shows 
how this process has a ‘cumulative character’. In a process 
of socialisation, religious believers receive from the past a 
religious heritage in the form of rites and practises; beliefs 
and norms; ideas and ideals; group pressure and family 
influences; vocabulary, metaphors and conceptual models; 
assumptions; social institutions; etc. This heritage includes 
the totality of conceptual forms in which their predecessors 
expressed in thought and action the faith that they in turn had 
received from their predecessors and in terms of which they 
interpreted their own lives and experience meaningfully. The 
heritage which they handed down to their successors was 
however not identical with what they had received. Changes 
in the circumstances and demands of life require changes 
and shifts in the way they understand their faith. Other 
aspects of the heritage of faith become relevant and necessary 
for believers to make sense of their lives and experience, and 
to do this adequately, they may also come to interpret these 
aspects of the heritage in ways which differ from that of their 
predecessors. By appropriating the heritage of faith and by 
expressing it again in their own time and circumstances, 
believers reconceptualise the heritage by adding their own 
conceptual form to it. In this way, a religious tradition is a 
cumulative process of interaction between the heritage from 
the past and the personal faith of believers who make the 
heritage their own. Obviously, the heritage of faith does not 
include the faith of later generations. This is added to the 
heritage of faith in the cumulative process of the tradition. The 
personal faith of believers is conditioned by the heritage but 
not completely determined by it. The personal faith of every 
believer adds his or her own authentic reconceptualisation to 
the heritage. 
It is clear that every tradition of faith, if it is to remain alive, 
must have the capacity for reconceptualising its heritage in 
ways that are logically coherent, relevant and adequate to 
the changing circumstances and demands of life, intelligible 
to the community of believers and credible in the light 
of the current state of knowledge (on the need for such 
reconceptualisation, see chapter 35 in Brümmer 2006). If 
for some reason, it should lose this capacity for renewal, a 
tradition of faith will become obsolete and forgotten. In the 
words of Fried, those who want the world to stay as it is, do 
not want it to stay (Fried 1994). In this way, the ancient fertility 
cults in the Mediterranean basin were so strongly embedded 
in an agrarian way of life that they could not survive the rise 
of trade, industry and the urbanisation of society. They proved 
quite inadequate as means of making sense of these changed 
circumstances in the lives of people (Kuitert 1977:144–145). 
On the other hand, those world religions that have remained 
relevant throughout the ages in spite of great changes in the 
culture and circumstances in the lives of their adherents could 
only remain so to the extent that they had the capacity for 
change and reconceptualisation. 
This has profound implications for the way in which 
philosophical theology tries to analyse the heritage of faith. 
Changes in the demands of life bring about changes in the 
aspects of the heritage which are relevant and necessary in 
order to make sense of life and cope meaningfully with our 
experience of the world. At different times and in different 
cultural situations, philosophical theology should therefore 
develop different conceptual models in order to highlight 
those aspects of the faith which are relevant to the cultural 
and historical situation and in order to filter out those aspects 
which are not relevant to the current demands of life. McFague 
(1987) provides a good example to illustrate this point: 
In an era when evil powers were understood to be palpable 
principalities in contest with God for control of human beings 
and the cosmos, the metaphor of Christ as the victorious king 
and lord, crushing the evil spirits and thereby freeing the world 
from their control, was indeed a powerful one. In our situation, 
however, to envision evil as separate from human beings rather 
than as the outcome of human decisions and actions, and to see 
the solution of evil as totally a divine responsibility, would be not 
only irrelevant to our time and its needs but harmful to them, for 
that would run counter to one of the central insights of the new 
sensibility: the need for human responsibility in a nuclear age. 
In other words, in order to do theology, one must in each epoch 
do it differently. To refuse this task is to settle for a theology 
appropriate to some other time than one’s own. (pp. 29–30)
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It is now clear that the philosophical theologian’s ‘ongoing 
project of supporting, elucidating, extending and connecting 
propositions of Christian doctrine by the standard 
philosophical means of analysis and argument’ (Kretzmann 
1989:16) cannot be merely descriptive, but it must be both 
critical and innovative as well. It should not merely describe 
the conceptual grammar of Christian doctrine, but it should 
also develop innovative proposals that are coherent, credible, 
intelligible, relevant and adequate to enable believers to cope 
with integrity with the changing demands of life (on the 
innovative task of philosophical theology, see chapters 35 
and 40 in Brümmer 2006). In this way, philosophical theology 
has an essential task to fulfil in service of the community of 
believers.
The fact that philosophical theology serves the community of 
believers in this way does not entail a retreat into an intellectual 
ghetto. Coherence, credibility, intelligibility, relevance and 
adequacy are after all external criteria that apply to every 
religion and also to secular views of life that function for many 
as alternatives for religious belief (on the intersubjectivity of 
these criteria, see chapter 41 in Brümmer 2006). They provide 
basic intellectual meeting-points common to believers and 
non-believers in the light of which the philosophical theologian 
seeks to justify the religious heritage and the beliefs entailed by 
it. It is clear that religious believers cannot ignore the criticism 
from outsiders that their faith fails to fulfil these requirements. 
Nor can they ignore the challenge from outsiders to show 
that their heritage can be conceptualised in ways that do. In 
this sense, philosophical theologians cannot rest content with 
merely analysing and describing the beliefs entailed within 
the context of a religious heritage. They are also bound to 
demonstrate that this heritage and the beliefs it entails are 
theoretically justified since they fulfil the common criteria of 
rationality. Furthermore this justification should not only be 
directed at fellow believers but also at outsiders who do not 
share the same heritage of faith. Of course such a justification 
does not amount to a knock-down proof which would force 
the outsiders to accept to the heritage of faith. Although 
coherence, credibility, intelligibility, relevance and adequacy 
are necessary conditions for accepting the heritage of faith, 
they are not sufficient. In the final analysis, the decision to 
ascribe to the heritage of faith is not merely intellectual but 
also existential. As we have argued above, everyone must 
personally come to recognise that he or she can appropriate 
the heritage of faith with integrity. No amount of intellectual 
argument can force this recognition on anybody (on the limits 
of rational argument, see Brümmer 1981:136–142 and chapter 
40 in Brümmer 2006).
 
Although the general limits of rationality also apply to this 
dialogue with outsiders, it is nevertheless an essential part 
of the project of philosophical theology. We have argued, 
however, that this dialogue should not be construed as one 
about the truth of decontextualised religious propositions as is 
the case in natural theology. On the contrary, it is primarily a 
dialogue about the theoretical legitimacy of a view of life as such 
and only in a derived sense about the truth of its constitutive 
presuppositions. Thus the theoretical legitimacy of truth claims 
about the existence of God can only be meaningfully discussed 
within the context of the religious view of life with which 
one can identify with integrity. Atheists who reject the claim 
that theistic faith is coherent, credible, intelligible, relevant or 
adequate for coping with the demands of life feel no need for 
the presupposition that God exists, which is constitutive for 
this faith. It is up to them, therefore, to reflect on the form of 
life they could authentically adopt and on the presuppositions 
constitutive of it. Christian theists, however, hold that the 
Christian faith can be coherently, credibly and intelligibly 
conceptualised in a form that is relevant and adequate for 
making sense of the demands with which life confronts them. 
If for this reason they can authentically make this form of life 
their own, then it is for them absurd to deny the truth of its 
constitutive presupposition, namely that the God in whose 
sight they live and move and have their being, exists in reality.
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